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Abstract 
This paper is a criticai examination of Putnam's theory of truth as it evolves from metaphy- 
sical to interna1 reaiism. First, 1 analyze the model-theoretic argument that led Putnam to 
abandon the metaphysical concept of truth as correspondence and to adopt and epistemic 
view of truth. Though a powerful critique of the metaphysical realist conception of truth, 
this argument does not establish conclusively that the concept of truth has any epistemiccon- 
tent. Secondly, 1 discuss Putnam's ideaiization theory of truth, arguing that the identification 
of truth with nacceptability under ideal conditions)) is at odds with the claim that truth is 
context-transcendent, since the notion of justificarion is intrinsically context-dependent 
and no amount of idealization can reedeem its contextuai character. Finally, 1 suggest that 
the realist intuitions that Putnam's internai realism tries to capture cal1 for no more [han 
a deflationary view of truth. Acceptance of this view requires abandoning not only the idea 
that truth is an epistemic property, but also the idea that truth is a substantiueproperty that 
al1 true statements share and, therefore, a proper object of philosophical theorizing. 
Key words: truth, Putnam, internal reaiism, acceptability, metaphisical realism, justifica- 
tion, idealization. 
Resum. Quk és ((ueritatii en el realisme intern? 
Aquest article és un examen crític de la teoria de la veritat de Putnam en la seva evolució 
des d'un realisme metafísic a un realisme intern. En primer Iloc, presento una analisi de 
I'argurnent de la teoria de models que va dur a Putnam a abandonar el concepte metafí- 
sic de veritat com a correspondencia i a adoptar un concepte epistemic de veritar. Aquest 
argument, encara que constitueix una potent crítica de la concepció de la veritat del realisme 
metafísic, no estableix conclusivament que la veritat tingui algun contingut epistkmic. En 
segon Iloc, discuteixo la teoria idealitzada de la veritat de Putnam, tot argumentant que la 
1. This paper is the product of many thought-provoking dicussions with Professor Meredith 
Williams in the winter of 1994. If there is any original idea in this paper, it is probably 
hers. 1 am also gateful for having had the oportunity to work with Arthur Fine and Michael 
Williams, which enabled me to read Putnam in a new light. The argument of this paper 
relies heavily on their philosophical work. 1 also want to thank ~rofessor Cristina Lafont 
for insightful discussions on Putnam and theories of truth, and David Bullwinkle for help- 
ful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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identificació de la veritat amb ~acceptabilitat en condicions idealsn no s'adiu amb la tesi 
que la veritat no  és contextual sinó transcendent, per tal com la noció de justificació és 
intrínsecament contextual i no hi ha idealització que la pugui redimir d'aquest caracter. 
Finalment, suggereixo que les intuicions realistes que el reaiisme intern de Putnam inten- 
ta captar no requereixen més que una perspectiva deflacionista sobre la veritat. Adoptar 
aquesta perspectiva implica abandonar no sols la idea que la veritat és una propietat epistk- 
mica, sinó també la idea que la veritat és una propietat substantiva que totes les afirma- 
cions verraderes comparteixen i que, per tant, és objecte d'una teoria filosbfica. 
Paraules clau: veritat, Putnam, realisme intern, acceptabilitat, realisme metafísic, justifi- 
cació, idealització. 
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1. Introduction 
What is realist about <<interna1 realism))? As Michael Devitt has pointed out2, 
it is difficult to understand the nature of Putnam's intellectual change, and to 
see anything realist about his new view. An important aspect of that change 
concerns Putnam's conception of truth. Putnam's view has shifted from an 
extra-theoretic and metaphysical notion of truth (Le. truth as correspondence 
with the mind-independent world) to an intra-theoretic and epistemic notion 
of truth (Le. truth as idealized ju~tification)~. However, Putnam insists, truth, 
the internal realist truth, though intra-theoretic, is not simply conventional 
and context-dependent. Unlike radical relativism, internal realism contains a 
substantial notion of correctness; and, unlike metaphysical realism, it links 
truth to justification. Putnarn seeks a theory of truth that grounds realist intui- 
tions without making truth epistemically inaccessible. Truth now becomes for 
2. M. Devitt, <(Realism and the Renegade Putnam~), Nous 17 (1983), p. 291-301. See p. 295. 
3. This shift takes place in Reason. Tmth and Histoy (Cambridge University Press: 1981) and 
Realism and Reaso~z. Philosophical Papers. Volume 3 (Cambridge University Press: 1983), 
where Putnam departs from the metaphysicai reaiism of his early writings (collected in the 
first m o  volurnes of his Philosophical Papers, Cambridge University Press: 1975). There is 
a further and more recent shift in Putnam's thought whose direcrion is srill unclear. In 
Words and L+ (Harvard Universiry Press: 1994), he no longer holds the conceprion of 
rruth as ((rationai acceptability under ideal conditionsn rhat he put fonvard in Reasoiz. Ti.uth 
and H i s t o ~  (see p. V for a short statement of his new position), but he still maintains that 
there is more to truth than a disquorational account can offer, that truth is aa substantive pro- 
perty)) (p. 326), and that there is a conceptual connection benveen truth and jusrification 
(see  doe es the Disquotational Theory Solve All Philosophical Problems?,,, p. 264-78; and 
((On Truthn, p. 315-29). 
What  is <<rrue)) in interna1 realism? Enrahonar 25, 1996 71 
him ((idealized rational acceptability)i. This idealization cheory of truth is what 
supports the minimalrealism that Putnam advocates. 
One virtue of internal realism that Putnam emphasizes is that it c a n explain 
the convergence of scientific knowledge (which is for him a crucial feature of 
mature science) without bringing in any metaphysical baggage. Putnam thinks 
that he can hold on to realism as an explanatory stance in philosophy of scien- 
ce without having recourse to inflationary metaphysics. But, as Arthur Fine 
and Michael Williams point out4, inflationism as such is not overcome in 
internal realism, for Putnam simply resorts to an inflationism of a different 
kind. In Fine's terms, Putnam becomes a ((semantic inflater or truthmonger)i. 
He inflates the notion of truth, not with metaphysical content, but with epis- 
temic content, by exchanging truth for ideal rational acceptability. The pro- 
blem is that that semantic inflationism will not give Putnam what he wants, or 
so 1 will argue. In the end Putnam will not get a substantial notion of correct- 
ness out of the identification of truth with justification. 
The trouble is that there is prima facie a strong asymmetry benveen truth 
and justification. As Putnam recognizes, justification is a contextual notion 
while truth is not. But Putnam thinks that he can bridge the gap between truth 
and justification by idealizing the latter, and so he concludes that truth should 
be treated simply ((as an idealization of justification»5. 1 will argue that once 
you tie truth to justification, no amount of idealization will make truth con- 
text-transcendent, for any idealization will have to be anchored to a specific 
epistemic context. We have no clue about what ideal justification can consist 
in independently of particular justification contexts. And when we actually 
determine the ideal justification conditions for a claim, such 
conditions are dependent on current justification standards in such a way chat, 
though ideal, they remain contextual, that is, parasitic on that epistemic con- 
text. After all, the idealization theory of truth fails to preserve the realist intui- 
tion that Putnam is so eager to nurse (Le. that truth is stable or convergent). 1 
will conclude, therefore, that there is nothing specifically realist about Putnam's 
idealized notion of truth. In fact, 1 will contend, the clarification of its epis- 
temic content, despite its idealization, makes internal realism indistinguisha- 
ble from a pragmatism a la Rorty (from whom Putnam is at pains to distance 
himself) . 
Finally, 1 will suggest that a merely disquotational elucidation of truth may 
be more congenial than the idealization theory to the minimal realism that 
Putnam wants to retain. Internal realism might be better offwith a deflationary 
view of truth, which is to say that no theory of truth is needed. The strategy ((let's 
idealize in order to remain realistsn does not seem to work. So maybe we should 
just leave truth alone if a realism without inflation is what we want. 
4. A. Fine, <<Trurhmongering: Less is True,,, Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 19 (1989), p. 
611-16, esp. p. 61 1; and M. Williams, {{Do We (Epistemolgists) Need a Theoiy ofTruth!)), 
Philosophical Topics 14 (1986), p. 223-42, esp. p. 237. 
5. ((Referente and Truth)), in Realirm and Reason, ibid., p. 84. 
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In my analysis of Putnam's view of truth 1 will be concerned with two ques- 
tions: first, whether the idealization theory makes the contexttranscendence of 
truth intelligible; and, second, whether a theory of truth is needed at al1 in order 
to preserve the reaiist intuition that truth is contexttranscendent. 1 will argue 
that both questions deserve a negative answer. In order to analyze and evalua- 
te Putnam's developing conception of truth a close examination of his central 
arguments is required. The argument that led Putnam to abandon the metaphy- 
sical notion of truth as correspondence and to refashion the concept of truth 
in epistemic terms in Reason. Tmth and Histo y (hereafier RTH) is to be found in 
«Models and ~ e a l i t y n ~ .  In the next section 1 will examine Putnam's move away 
from metaphysical realism via the model-theoretic argument of that paper. 
Section 111 will focus on the epistemic content and the idealizations that Putnam 
b d d s  into the notion of truth. And the final section will discuss whether the con- 
cept of truth can be taken as an object of philosophical theorizing, that is, whet- 
her we need a philosophical theory of truth that goes beyond the mere logical 
analysis and pragmatic elucidation of the predicate ((true)). 
11. From metaphysicai realism to interna1 reaiism: the model-theoretic 
argument 
In «The Meaning of "Meaning")) Putnam argues that since we use the notions 
of truth and extension in an extra-theoretic way, we have to accept the realist 
perspective to which these extra-theoretic notions belong7. In that paper 
Putnam's view was that it is the world itself that decides what belongs and 
what does not belong to the extension of our terms: e.g., it is the microstruc- 
ture of the stuff ((out there), that we cal1 water that determines membership in 
the extension of the term «water». This realist notion of reference is tied to a 
correspondence theory of truth8. A statement is true just when, and because, 
there is a state of &airs corresponding to it, that is, when the appropriate refe- 
rential relations between its component parts and reality obtain. These 
substantial concepts of truth and reference are said to play a cruciai explanatory 
role in scientzj5c realism, which, following Richard Boyd9, Putnam defines as 
an interpretative hypothesis that includes two central theses, namely: 
1. Terms in mature science rypically refer. 
2. The laws of a theory belonging to a rnature science are rypicaily approxi- 
mately truelO. 
6 .  In Realism and Reason, ibid., p. 1-25. Norice rhat <<Models and Reality (1977) was writren 
before RTH (1981), although ir was not published until 1983 in Volume 3 of Purnam's 
Philosophical Papers. 
7. aThe Meaning of "~Meaning",,, in Mind,  Language, and Reality. Philosophical Papers. 
Volurne 1, Cambridge University Press: 1975, p. 236. 
8.  See Meaningand theMoralSciences, Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1978, Lecture 11, p. 18-33. 
9. Realism and Scientzjc Epistemolohy, Carnbridge University Press: 1978. 
10. Ibid., p. 20. 
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These two principles taken together are supposed to account for the beha- 
vior of scientists and the success of science, notably the convergence of theo- 
ries in mature science. The reference of scientific terrns and the truth of scientific 
laws were understood by Boyd and Putnam in metaphysical realist terrns, that 
is, in terms of correspondence between scientific language and the mind-inde- 
pendent world. However, Devitt notices that 1 and 2 are compatible with any 
view of truth and reference, and that they do not, by thernselves, e n t d  rnetaphy- 
sical realisrn". The possibility of substracting rnetaphysical realisrn from the 
interpretative hypothesis expressed in 1 and 2 that Devitt points out seems to 
have been precisely Putnam's thought. Realisrn as an explanation of scientific 
practice acquires a renewed interest for Putnam when he realizes that it can in 
fact be detached from any rnetaphysical thesis12. 1 and 2 constitute the realist 
skeleton that remains after Putnarn's transition from metaphysical to internal 
realisrn. The notions of truth and reference used in those principles are sirnply 
reinterpreted or, if you like, internalized13. 
The thought that moves Putnarn to ((internalize), his earlier view is that we 
can be realists without having to resort ro metaphysically-inflated semantic 
notions. The guiding intuition of internal realism seems to be the realization 
that we do not need extra-theoretic notions of truth and reference to explain 
the convergence of scientific theories. Devitt writes: 
Let T' be the successor of T in any rnature science. Then convergence holds if and 
only ifffom theperspective ofl', the terrns of T typically refer and the laws of T are 
typically approximately true14. 
convergence requires only truth and reference relative to a theory, not uni- 
que correspondence with a rnind-independent world. Realism needs nothing 
more than intra-theoretic sernantic notions. 
Moreover, Putnam now argues, the correspondence theory of truth ulti- 
mately fails to make sense of the convergence of scientific knowledge, for in 
explaining truth in purely nonepistemic terms, it makes truth inaccesible. 
11. For Devitt this means that there is nothing specifically realist about the interpretative hypot- 
hesis that Boyd and Putnam put forth, and that we should look for realism elsewhere. 
Devitt argues that reaiism is simply the thesis that there exists a mind-independent world. 
He emphasizes that such chesis is devoid of semantic content. In particular, he insists that 
no doctrine of truth is constitutive of realism as he understands it ({[Realism and the Renegade 
Putnam)), ibid., p. 293). 
12. See (<Realism and Reason)), in Meaningand the MoralSciences, ibid., p. 123-138. 
13. Notice that acceptance of realism as an explanation of scientific practice by the literal truth 
of scienrific theories does not automatically commit one to any theory of truth. In fact, as 
Williams has argued, realism as an interpretarion of science does not seem to require a subs- 
tantiai notion of truth at all: aeven if we agreed that the success of our theories is explai- 
ned by their truth, we shall have no reason for adopting a richer-than-disquotational 
conception of truth itselfn (aDO We (Epistemologists) Need a Theory of Truth?,,, ibid., 
p. 228). 
14. M. Devitt, <<Realism and the Renegade Putnam,,, ibid., p. 294. 
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The idea of an abstract isomorphism between language and reality, an abstract 
mapping of concepts onto things in the world, is not in the end very helpful. 
The problem is that «too many correspondences exist» (RTH, p. 73) and to 
single out the right correspondence between words and things, the ultimate 
adequate reference relations, would require an epistemic access to mindinde- 
pendent objects that we lack. But if al1 correspondences are equally good, if 
any model can make a theory true, then no real convergence will obtain. As 
Putnam puts it, «[i]f al1 it takes to make a theory true is abstract correspon- 
dence (never mind which), then incompatible theories can be true» (RTH, 
p. 73). But the metaphysical realist holds that truth is unique corresponden- 
ce, that there is One True Theory on which al1 scientific knowledge will 
ultimately converge. This view, Putnam argues, is ultimately unintelligible. 
He thinks that its unintelligibility can be shown in purely logical terms. This 
is what Putnam attempts to do in ((Models and Realityn, which contains the 
most complete formulation of Putnam's logical argument. This argument is 
the cornerstone of Putnam's transition from metaphysical to internal realism15. 1 
In ((Models and Realityn Putnam offers an argument based on set theory 
which is intended to uncover the logical incoherence of the correspondence 
theory of truth. The argument has two different, though interrelated, parts. l 
In the first part Putnam argues that the notion of correspondence between 
words and discourse-independent objects is highly problematic and the view l 
of truth as unique correspondence a non-starter. The second part of the argu- 
ment is intended to show that a radically non-epistemic notion of truth is 
unintelligible. 
~ 
In the first part of his model-theoretic argument Putnam claims that set 
theory teaches us that «the total use of the language (operational plus theore- 
tical constraints) does not «fix a unique ((intended interpretation»16. 
Oversimplifying Putnam's argument and disregarding the technical niceties of 
set theory, the central idea seems to be that for any model M of a theory, we can 
always construct a model M' which satisfies equally well al1 the theoretical and 
operational constraints of that theory, by simply establishing a one-to-one 
correspondence between the elements of the universe of M (say 1, 2, 3,. . .) 
and the elements of the universe of M' (say l', 2', 3',. . .). No matter what ope- 
rational and theoretical constraints you place on a theory, you can always find 
more than one model that makes the theory true. The upshot of the argument 
is that there are always infinitely many different reference relations which satisfy 
al1 of the constraints that our practice may impose on our use of a language. 
Putnam concludes, therefore, that no sense can be made of the metaphysical 
realist claim that there is a unique language-world c~rres~ondence'~.  
A causal theory of reference to which realists like Boyd or Putnam's for- 
mer self typically resort cannot solve the ((toa-many-correspondences)) pro- 
15. See footnote 6. 
16. «Models and Real iy ,  ibid., p. 4, emphasis dropped. 
17. Ibid., p. 16. 
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blem. A causal theory (or for that matter any theory of reference) cannot single 
out one unique correspondence because ir simply adds more theoretical cons- 
traints to the semantic interpretation of the language, and again these constraints 
can be satisfied by more than one model. As Putnam puts it, unless the word 
«causes)) «is already glued to one definite relation with metaphysical glue, this 
does not fix a determinate extension for "refers" at a11))18. 
What Putnam wants to conclude from this argument is that truth and refe- 
rente are intra-theoretic notions. Putnam takes the argument to show that the 
semantic interpretation of a theory is crucially dependent on the ((conven- 
tions)) that we adopti9 hence the (<theory-dependence of meaning and truthn20. 
The problem of indeterminacy arises only when we attempt to pin down the 
semantic interpretation of a theory from an external standpoint. From the pers- 
pective of its user the theory comes with an intended interpretation. It is only 
when we attempt to assign to it a semantic interpretation from a detached 
perspective (from a standpoint external to t he theory) that we are confronted 
with an infinity of models. And then no amount of constraints of whatever 
kind will single out one model. If you separate language and reality there is 
no way you can put them back together again. So the trick is not to introdu- 
ce a gap between langua e and the world in the first place. Reference and truth 
have to be internalized', i . e  relativized to a theory, point of view, or ((con- 
ceptual scheme)). The result of this internalization is that the idea of a single true 
picture of the world, the God's Eye View of metaphysical realism, is abando- 
ned. Internal realism urges us to give up the old ideal of the One True Theory. 
As Putnam puts it in RTH, <cwhy should there not sometimes be equally cohe- 
rent but incompatible conceptual schemes which fit our experiential beliefs 
equally well? If truth is not (unique) correspondence then the possibility of a 
certain pluralism is opened up)) (p. 73, emphasis added). 
If one side of the model-theoretic argument shows that truth is intra-the- 
oretic, the other side is intended to prove that truth is an epistemic notion. 
The claim of this part of the argument is that the metaphysical realist view 
that truth outruns even idealized j~st i f iabi l i t~ is incoherent. The intuition of 
the metaphysical realist is that truth depends exclusively on the way the world 
is, and the world might be very different from the best knowledge of it that 
we can possibly have. Correspondence with the world is not assured even for 
the best imaginable theory if truth depends only on the way the world is inde- 
pendently of us. But Putnam's claim is that we do not even understand a radi- 
18. Ibid., p. 18. Devitt argues against Putnam that in a causal theory the predicate causally 
related is aglued to one definite relation)) by causal relations, not with ((metaphysical glue)) 
(~Realism and the Renegade Putnam,,, ibid., p. 298). Devitr conrends thar a semantic the- 
ory applies to al1 theories, including itself, and that such self-reference need not be pro- 
blematic. 
19. aModels and Reality)), ibid., p. 10. 
20. Ibid., p. 1 l .  
21. ~Models  are not lost noumenal waifs looking for someone to name them; they are cons- 
tructions within our theory itself, and they have names from birth,, (ibid., p. 25). 
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cally non-epistemic concept of truth. The argurnent goes as f ~ l l o w s ~ ~ .  Imagine 
a possible forrnalization TI of ideal scientific theory, that is, the best theory of 
the world possible for us humans, a theory at the limit of scientific investiga- 
tion which fits al1 possible observational evidence and satisfies al1 possible the- 
oretical constraints. Putnam's contention is that no sense can be rnade of the 
claim that such an ideal theory might be false, for, by definition, that theory will 
come out true in al1 possible rnodels. The rnetaphysical conception of truth 
as correspondence with the language and mind-independent world makes 
truth inaccesible for us, and is ultimately ~ n i n t e l l i ~ i b l e ~ ~ .  Putnarn concludes 
that we need a new analysis of the concept of truth in episternic terms. He 
reads his model-theoretic argument as a vindication of the connection betwe- 
en truth and our epistemic access to the world: how we represent the world 
becornes deterrninant for truth, which is refashioned in terms of coherence 
relations between representations (see RTH, p. 49-50). But what is realist 
about this conception of truth? 
Note that the intuition that what is most justifiable to believe rnay none- 
theless be false is not really the exclusive property of metaphysicalrealism. It is 
rather the core intuition of allibilism, which is an essential component of any 
4f realism properly so called2 . That intuition is independent of what we consi- 
der the ((naturen of truth to be (whether a correspondence relation or somet- 
hing else); in fact it is independent of whether or not we think truth has a 
ccnaturen in the first place. What the intuition expresses is sirnply that our 
knowledge of the world (whether actual or ideal) cannot determine what is 
true, that is, that the concept of truth is nonepistemic. Metaphysical realism 
is not the only view that gives content to the fallibilist intuition. A purely dis- 
quotational account of the predicate ((true)) also captures that intuition. In fact, 
unlike a correspondence theory, a disquotational account gives a precise for- 
rnulation to the fallibilist intuition by showing that the truth of p neither 
entails, nor is entailed by, our knowing that punder ideal conditions, that the 
predicate ((true)) is not equivalent to (cknowable at the end of inquiqn). According 
to disquotationalism, what is involved in a sentence's being true is fully captured 
by the sentence itself hence the disquotational scherne (("p" true if and only if 
p)). To say that a staternent is true is not to say that what it expresses counts 
as knowledge for us, or that it would under ideal epistemic conditions; it is 
just to make the statement over again (hence the redundancy property of 
«true»): « " p  is true iff p)), not ((iff p is knowable at the end of inquiry or under 
ideal episternic conditions)). So, as Williams puts it25, 
22. Models and Reality, ibid., p. 11-13. 
23. «The metaphysicai reaiist's claim that even the ideal theory TI might be false "in reaiity" 
seems to collapse into unintelligibility)) (ibid., p. 13). 
24. For a lucid examination of the complex conceptual connections benveen fallibilism, truth 
and realism, see C. Lafont, ,<Truth, Knowledge and Reality,,, Graduate Faculy Philosophy 
journal1812 (1995), p. 109-126 
25. «Do We (Epistemologists) Need a Theory of Truth?n, ibid., p. 224. 
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Thin as it is, even disquotational truth is «realistic», to the extent that, on a dis- 
quotational view, indeed deflationary views generally, truth is no more an episte- 
mic property than it is on a full-blooded correspondence theory. 
It is dificult to see how one can be a realist without being a fallibilist, that 
is, without keeping the concepts of truth and justification separate. A radical 
antifallibilism which identifies truth with knowledge is just pure idealism. 1s 
there any room left for fallibilism in Putnam's view? Putnam's' argument cur- 
tails significantly the force of fdibilism. In his view there is room only for a weak 
fallibilism: our knowledge is de facto fallible, but its fallibility lies in the con- 
tigent conditions of our epistemic position; could we adopt an ideal episte- 
mic position, truth would coincide with knowledge, which is to say that our 
knowledge would be infallible. O n  this view, the defeasibility of knowledge 
stems from the contingent gap between what is true and what we find acceptable 
given our epistemic situation. The ongoing revision of our knowledge reflects 
our constant effort to fd in that gap. But the gap is supposed to close under ideal 
conditions, and therefore as we approximate those conditions, there should 
be an increasing convergence between truth and knowledge. For Putnam, it 
is a mistake to suppose, as a strong fallibilism does, that there is an in principle 
unbridgable gap between truth and knowledge. He argues that the strong falli- 
bilist conception of truth and objectivity as knowledge-transcendent is unwa- 
rranted and ultimately unintelligible when it comes to an ideal theory. For, 
since an ideal theory of the world is a theory whose formalization comes out 
true in al1 possible models (i.e. in al1 possible semantic interpretations), it is 
senseless to think that it might turn out to be false. For Putnam, this is supposed 
to express a conceptual truth about ((ideal theories)). This is just what an ideal 
theory is: a theory that cannot be false. 1s this a definite refutation of strong 
fallibilism? In what follows 1 will argue that a strong fallibilist need not be bot- 
hered by Putnam's argument, for in her view there is no room for such thing 
as an «ideal theory of the world)). 
What is unintelligible about the supposition that an ideal theory might be 
false? 1s it the very idea that no piece of human knowledge is infallible that is 
unintelligible? How is it that this idea is not only intelligible but quite intui- 
tive with respect to actual theories and beliefs, and yet highly problematic with 
respect to ideal theories? What is so special about an ideal theory? Why is it 
impossible to think that the world might be different from the way an ideal 
theory would describe it? Indeed if we build into the very notion of ((episte- 
mically ideal theory)) the impossibility of error, then we cannot make sense of 
the possibility of that theory being wrong. But it is not clear that we unders- 
tand what an epistemically ideal theory is in the first place. That an ideal the- 
ory is true can be said to be analytic, true by stipulation. But do we really 
understand that stipulation? Devitt points out that it is not clear at al1 what a 
theory that satisfied al1 theoretical and operational constraints would consist in2'. 
26. ~Realism and the Renegade Putnam)), ibid., p. 297 
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We are told that TI fits al1 ~ossible observational evidence, but i n what sense 
of ((possible))? 1s the possible evidence, Devitt asks, what human s would have 
gathered if they were at every point of actual space-time? Or  what they would 
have gathered if they had performed al1 possible experiments? Or  both? And 
what sense can we make of the idea of ((possible experiments))?.  . The list of 
questions can be extended indefinitely. So maybe the supposition that an ideal 
theory might be false is unintelligible just because the notion of an ideal the- 
ory itself is unintelligible. We cannot make sense of the infallibility of an ideal 
theory any more than we can make sense of our being omniscient. If it is a 
conceptual truth that an ideal theory cannot be false, so much the worse for ideal 
theories. This alleged ccconceptual truthn does not force us to give up our falli- 
bilist intuitions. The strong fallibilist may simply drop the notion of ((ideal 
theory)) as an untenable philosophical construct. This construct conjures up 
what, from the perspective of strong fallibilism, is an unsound philosophical pic- 
ture: the picture opf us at our absolute best. From the standpoint of a thorough 
fallibilism, we can always do better or worse within any given epistemic prac- 
tice, but there is no ((absolute best)) for allepistemic practices that we can pic- 
ture as an ideal. So postulating an ((ideal theory)) as the absolute best we can 
do, as the ideal terminus of human knowledge, is begging the question against 
the fallibilist. The contention of strong fallibilism is that human knowledge 
is always fallible, always subject to revision, and therefore that there is no such 
thing as an ((ideal theory)). and this means, not just that such a theory is 
impossible for us to attain (which is agreed by al1 parts), but rather, that we 
can make no sense of the idea of (can ideal theory of the world)) which deter- 
mines what is true in our actual epistemic practices, at least no more sense 
than we can make of a God's Eye View of reality2'. 
So the defender of fallibilism may reject Putnam's argument by denying 
its premise. Indeed in a truly corrigibilist outlook the idea of a final theory, a 
theory which is exempt from error, simply does not make sense. The defen- 
der of corrigibilism can take Putnam's argument to show, not that there is a 
limit up to which fallibilist intuitions make sense, but simply that there is 
a limit up to which idealizations make sense. But it is not only the explicit 
idealizations in Putnam's argument that are problematic, but also a hidden idea- 
lization that is liable to pass unnoticed: the idealization implicit in the idea of 
((total sciencen, the idea of science as a unified ((theory of the world)). So let 
me backtrack a bit and examine what is factored into the premise of Putnam's 
argument. He writes: 
27. Note diat the notion of an nideai theoly of the world), is the direct heir of the God's Eye View 
of Reaiity of metaphysical realism: ir is just the Absolute View intemlized turned into a Tegu- 
lative ideal, made accesible to us through the idealization of our episternic point of view. 
For a thorough fallibilist, chis idea is not an operative regulative ideal, thar is, an ideal rhat 
we actually use for making sense of our epistemic practices. Why should we think of scien- 
tific pracrices as conrributing to a theory of the world thar satisfies al1 obsewarional and 
theoretical constraints? 
What  is muen in interna1 realism? Enrahonar 25, 1996 79 
Let us assume that there exists a possible formalization of present-day total scien- 
ce, call it 'T', and also that there exists a possible formalization of ideal scientific 
theory, call it 'T,'. T, is to be «ideal» in the sense of being epistemicalb ideal for 
humans. Idealitp, in this sense, is a rather vague n ~ t i o n ~ ~ .  
Putnam acknowledges that it is difficult to determine what counts as ((epis- 
temically ideal for usj). He seems to be sensitive to the problems involved in 
idealizing our present epistemic position and the scientific view of the world 
that we have arrived at, but he seems to accept uncritically that we have a n 
((epistemic positionn, that there is such thing as our ((present-day total sciencen. 
What renders problematic the notion of an ((ideal theory)) is not just the ide- 
alizations that we make of our current scientific ((theory of the world)), but the 
very supposition that we have such a «theory», that our scientific practices add 
up to a unified theoretical picture. The problem with the idea of an «ideal 
epistemic position)) is not simply that it is difficult to establish the correct ide- 
alizations of our actual epistemic position; the real problem starts with the 
prior assumption that there is something called ((our epistemic positionj), «our 
view of the worldj). This is what Williams calls ((epistemological r e a l i s m ~ ~ ~ .  
((Epistemological realism,), as Williams describes it, ((is not realism as a posi- 
tion within epistemology -the thesis that we have knowledge of an objecti- 
ve, mind-independent reality- but something quite different: realism about 
the objects of epistemological inqui~y»~O. The seemingly unproblematic assump- 
tion of the unity of science hides in fact an epistemological realism with respect 
to scientific knowledge: the view that al1 scientic beliefs hang together in an 
interesting way, that they al1 share some kind of ((heoretical integrityx that 
makes them the proper object of philosophical theory, that scientific Icnowledge 
constitutes a «surveyable whole)), a «natural kind)). But there is no secure basis 
that guarantees that a wholesale assessment of scientific knowledge is possi- 
ble. As Williams puts it, talhng about cknowledgex in general, 
Al1 we know for sure is that we have various practices of assessment, perhaps 
sharing certain formal features. It does not follow from this that the various items 
given a positive rating add up to anything like a natural kind. So it does not follow 
that they add up to a surveyable whole, to a genuine totality rather than a more or 
less loose aggregate3'. 
It goes without saying that Putnam's argument does have force against [he 
correspondence theory of truth that explains science in terms of convergente 
to a single description of the world, the One True Theory. But it is impor- 
tant to notice that the argument undermines the realist intuition that truth is 
independent of justification only when that intuition is combined with epis- 
28. aModels and Realiqw, ibid., p. 12. 
29. See Unnatural Doubts (Blackwell:1991), p. 101-1 11. 
30. Ibid., p. 108, emphasis added. 
31. Ibid., p. 109. 
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temological realism. The argument presupposes that al1 scientific beliefs hang 
together in a big picture which ultimately will be an ideally complete view of 
the world, and that a global assessment of total science is possible, that is, 
that the evaluation of al1 scientific beliefs, al1 at once, is viable. Williams 
remarks that it is this view in conjunction with a nonepistemic theory of truth 
that makes truth utterly inaccesible and leads to radical ~ c e ~ t i c i s m ~ ~ .  As he 
puts it, it is only c<questions about the justifiability of everythingx that makes 
us «feel under pressure to establish any general relation betcveen justification and 
t r ~ t h n ~ ~ .  On  a nonfoundarionalist (i.e., contextualist) view of knowledge, there 
is no room for such questions, so the inference from fallibilism to radical scep- 
ticism is blocked and the pressure to find an internal relation between justifi- 
cation and truth disappears. 
It is important to notice that Putnam's model-theoretic argument would 
be an argument for the internal connection benveen justification and truth 
only if the correspondence theory were the only non-epistemic notion of 
truth available and belief in the independence of truth from acceptability auto- 
matically committed one to metaphysical realism. But Putnam is not justified 
in concluding from his argument against the metaphysical realist view of truth 
as correspondence that truth has to be thought in epistemic terms. The argu- 
ment does not by itself succeed in esrablishing the connection benveen truth 
and justification because an important alrernative is overlooked, namely, the 
merely disquotational account of truth. That deflationary view of truth is also 
non-epistemic and, as Williams points out, it can be viewed as «a kind of mini- 
mal r e a l i s m ~ ~ ~ ,  for it accommodates perfectly well the realist intuition that 
even our rnost justified beliefs might turn out to be false. The fallibilism that the 
deflationary attitude towards truth brings with it avoids the problems of 
metaphysical realism and is untouched by Putnam's argument. However, for rea- 
sons that we will see in the last secrion, Putnam does not take the deflationary 
view of truth as a serious alternative. So from the collapse of the correspon- 
dence theory of truth he simply concludes that truth is an epistemic notion 
to be elucidated in terms of justifiability. 
Before turning to my analysis of the epistemic content that Putnam builds 
into the notion of truth, 1 just want to emphasize the crucial role that Putnam's 
model-theoretic argurnent has in his intellectual development, for it marks the 
transition from an extra-theoretic and non-epistemic to an internalist notion 
of truth. It is interesting to note thar in that argument Putnam makes a sig- 
nificant use of Peirce's view of truth in order to show that truth does not outrun 
justification (Le. an epistemically ideal theory cannot be false). Now, though 
Putnam does not want to make truth dependent on «the ideal end of inquiryx 
or <can ideal community of inquirers)), his account of truth contains problems 
similar to the ones the Peircean view has, for it retains the highly problema- 
32. See his <<Coherente, Justification and Truthn, Review ofMetaphysics 34 (1980), p. 243-272. 
33. Ibid., p. 272. 
34. <(Do We (Episternologists) Need a Theory of Truth?,>, ibid., p. 224. 
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tic notion of what is ((epistemically ideal)). It is not clear how such a proble- 
matic notion can explicate the much simpler notion of truth. More importantly, 
it is not clear how an ideaiization theory can make the context-transcendence 
of truth inteligible. To this issue 1 now turn. 
111. Truth, justification and idealization 
In ((Reference and Truth)) Putnam argues that though Michael Dummett's 
identification of truth with justification points in the right direction, it is not 
sufficient to explicate the notion of truth. We have to manipulate the notion 
of justification in such a way that it can account for certain aspects that we 
regard as constitutive of the notion of truth. In the first place, while truth is ((a 
property of a statement that cannot be l o ~ t ) ) ~ ~ ,  justification is both tensed (for 
a time and place) and relative to a person. In the second place, justification 
admits degrees whereas truth does not. So the question is how a contextual 
and gradient notion such as justification can explain a context-transcendent and 
absolute notion such as truth. Through ideaiization, Putnam answers. Truth is 
just an ideaiization of justification. A statement is true if it would be justified 
«under epistemically ideal conditions)). Putnam explains the role of ((episte- 
micail ideal conditions)) in his view of truth by analogy with ((frictionless pla- G nesn3 . We cannot really attain epistemically ideal conditions, but, Putnam 
argues, they are a usefull idealization that helps us clarify what we mean by 
(me)) .  He  writes: 
Frictionless planes cannot really be attained either, and yet talk of frictionless pla- 
nes has xcash value)) because we can approxirnate them to a very high degree of 
accuracy3'. 
However, there is a strong disanalogy between epistemically ideal condi- 
tions and frictionless planes that threatens the claim that talk of the former 
has cccash valuen The idealization of frictionless planes is parasitic on a well- 
defined notion of friction that we can quantify and assign value O even though 
we know that no physical context actually yields such value. But there is no 
parallel in Putnam's idealization of justification because we lack a clearcut con- 
cept of what ((epistemic conditions)) in general are. So the problem with epis- 
temicaily ideal conditions is not that they are not attainable, but that we do 
not know what they are because we do not really understand what that idea- 
lization means. As Putnam himself points out in RTH (p. 5 j), we can never be 
completely certain that we actually approximate those conditions, while we 
have a very precise notion of what it means for a body to approximate fric- 
tionless motion. Let me explore the disanaiogy further to see its implications. 
35. ((Reference and Truthn, in Realism and Reason, ibid., p. 84.  
36.  Ibid., p. 55. 
37. Ibid., p. 84. 
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The notion of friction does not change in meaning from context to context. 
((Friction)) means surface resistance to motion whatever the bodies involved in 
the motion happen to be. And since the meaning of friction is fixed for al1 
contexts, it is unproblematic to apply the idealization of frictionless planes to 
any case of motion. However, though Putnam's idealization of justification is 
supposed to apply to any statement, it cannot have the sarne meaning for al1 sta- 
tements, for there is no single set of epistemic conditions of justification for 
every statement. The ~epistemic onditions)) under which (cp» is justified are not 
independent of the content of «p)). What counts as justification conditions in 
any given situation is cruciallv dePendent on what those conditions are con- 
ditions of. But if justification conditions are content-specific, so are idealjus- 
tification conditions. There is no reason to believe that idealization will make 
the notion of justification lose its contentspecificity. So the assumption that 
there is a unique and consistent set of ideal justification conditions for our 
((knowledge of the world)) is unwarranted. For al1 we know, the ideal justifi- 
cation conditions of different statements may not cohere in any interesting 
way. Even if we could specifj the ideal justification conditions for each and 
every statement about the world, nothing (other than «epistemological rea- 
l i s rn~~*)  guarantees that we could add them al1 up to obtain the ideal conditions 
for the justification of our ((knowledge of the world)). Until it is shown that 
there are underlying commonalities in the justification conditions of every sta- 
tement about the world, until it is shown that what we cal1 ((knowledge of the 
world)) is a ((surveyable whole)) rather than a ((oose aggrega:e)>, there is no rea- 
son to believe that the ideal justification conditions of al1 statements about the 
world have some cohesive core (i.e. a set of common features). 
Furthermore, what counts as epistemically ideal conditions is not only sta- 
tementspecific but also radically context-dependent. Propositions do not bring 
with them their own justification conditions. Only an epistemological realist 
(a realist about the objects of episternological inquiry39) can maintain that a 
proposition has in itself epistemic properties that we can survey. For Putnam, 
however, the justification conditions of any given statement cannot be exa- 
mined independently of the context the statement figures in. So what counts 
as epistemically ideal conditions for the justification of a proposition is cru- 
cially dependent on the actual context of justification in which the proposi- 
tion appears. But it is only in conjunction with an epistemological realism that 
Putnam rejects that the view of truth as idealized justification can make truth 
context-transcendent. Only if the concept of justification, like the concept of 
friction, remains fixed across contexts can the idealization of justification, like 
the idealization of frictionless planes, have ((cash value)). But Putnam holds 
that there is «no single general rule or universal method for knowing what 
conditions are better or worse for justi$ing an arbitrary empirical j~dgrnent»*~. 
38. See p. 15 above. 
39. See p. 66 above. See also M. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, ibid., p. 108 
40. Realism and Reason, ibid., p. XVII. 
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What we consider to be the ideal justification of a statement will vary from 
context to context. Truth, however, is for Putnam a permanent «property» of 
the statement. The gap between truth and justification is not successfully brid- 
ged by idealization when epistemological realism is given up. If what counts 
as epistemically ideal conditions of justification is not determined by the sta- 
tement itself, but rather by us in particular justification contexts and accor- 
ding to specific standards, then what counts as ideal today (or in this context 
of justification) may not count as ideal tomorrow (or in some other context of 
justification). As Putnam puts it, ((the justification conditions for sentences 
change as our total body of knowledge changes, and cannot be taken as fixed 
once and for alIn4l. No amount of idealization will repair this lack of fixity, 
and therefore the identification of truth with justification (whether actual or 
ideal) cannot make truth a permanent ((property)) of statements. What proce- 
dures we regard as justificatory depends on our criteria of acceptability and if 
truth is idealized justification, truth itself becomes relative to those criteria. 
As our acceptability criteria change our epistemic idealizations change with 
them. 
The idealization of our current context of justification may succeed in making 
the truth of a statement independent of the evidence presently available in that 
context, since the idealization forces us to think of a situation in which d the pos- 
sible evidence (whatever that means) is available. But that idealization does not 
succeed in making the truth of the statement independent of the justification 
context in which (and the defeasible standards according to which) the ideal 
justification conditions are envisioned. No matter how much idealization we 
introduce, the identification of truth with justification forces us to view truth 
as a contextual notion. In fact, this is what Putnam seems to conclude in his 
most internalist and least realist moments: (ctruth)) (idealized justification) is as 
vague, interest relative, and context sensitive as we are. The ((truth conditionsn 
for an arbitrary sentence are not surveyable in Dummett's 
In Putnarn's idealization theory the holistic aspects of justification are trans- 
ferred to truth, which is now explained in terms of coherence. Putnam's view 
thus comes close to a coherence theory, as his internalist definition of truth in 
RTH makes clear. Truth is, he writes, 
Sorne sort of (idealized) rational acceptability some sort of ideal coherence of our 
beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are repre- 
sented in our belief system. RTH, p. 49-50, ernphasis dropped. 
Putnam remarks that our conceptions of coherence and acceptability are 
deeply interwoven with our biology, our culture, and our values. «They defi- 
ne», Putnam says, «a kind of ob jec t i~ i t~ ,  objectivityfor U S » * ~ .  It is not prima 
41. <<Referente and Truth),, ibid., p. 85. 
42. Realism and Reason, ibid., p. XVII. 
43. ~Reference and Trurh,), ibid., p. 5 5. 
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facie clear how this view is different from relativism. There is indeed a strong 
antirealist tendency in the notion of truth as coherence. Putnam's epistemic 
idealizations are supposed to counterbalance that tendency. Again it is ideali- 
zation, Putnarn thinks, that does the work to keep us realists. However, it is 
not at al1 clear that a realist notion of truth, an objective and context trans- 
cendent notion of correctness, can be derived frorn Putnam's epistemic idea- 
lizations, for, as we have seen, they are ineluctably parasitic on particular 
acceptability criteria. 
Richard Rorty argues that in the end «idealized» adds nothing tocrational 
a~ce~tability)),  for Putnarn does not show how we can understand eidealized 
rational acceptability), otherwise than as acceptability to an ideal ~ommuni ty*~.  
And if Putnam does not want to appeal to Peirce's notion of a community of 
inquirers at the ideal lirnit of inquiry, such an ideal community cannot be but 
«US at our best)). «Identifying "idealized rational acceptability" with "accepta- 
bility to us at our best")), Rorty contends, ((is just what 1 had in mind when 1 
said that pragmatists should be ethnocentrists rather than relativi~ts»*~. However, 
Putnarn has repeatedly expressed his discomfort with such a radical pragmatism. 
In Realism with a Human Face Putnarn formulates five different principles 
of warranted assertability in order to distance himself frorn ~ o r t y ~ ( ' .  The main 
point of disagreernent between them is that while for Rorty al1 norrnativity is 
contextual (i.e. warranted assertability is always for a time and place), Putnarn 
wants to preserve the idea of ((some kind of correctness which is substantial)). 
Rorty's reservations concern Putnam's first two principles of warranted asser- 
tability: 
1. In ordinary circumstances, there is usually a fact of the matter as to whet- 
her the statements people make are warranted or not. 
2. Whether a statement is warranted or not is independent of whether the 
majority of one's cultural peers would say it is warranted or unwarranted4'. 
For Rorty the only fact of the matter as to whether or not S is warranted in 
asserting p is a sociological one and has to be ascertained «by observing the 
reception of S's statement by her peers))48. Putnam, however, seems to allude in 
1 to something more than merely a matter of sociological fact. In fact 1 sug- 
gests that epistemic warrants are utterly independent of sociological conside- 
rations. But then, Rorty argues, Putnam talks as if warrant could be viewed 
((sub specie aeternitatis)), as if there were some natural order of reasons that 
determines whether S is warranted in asserting p. 
44. R. Rorry, ~Purnam and [he Relarivist Menacen, Journal ofPhilosophy Vol. XC, N .  9 (1993), 
p. 443-61, esp. p. 451. 
45. Ibid., p. 452. 
46. See ~Realism wirh a Human Face,), in Realism with a Human Face (Harvard University 
Press: 1990), p. 21-6. 
47. Ibid., p. 21. 
48. <<Purnam and [he Relativist Menacen, ibid., p. 449. 
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With respect to (2) Rorty says that the majority can indeed be ~ r o n ~ ~ ~ :  p 
might be true even if the majority of S's cultural peers does not consider her to 
be justified in holding p. But how can p be in that case warranted? 
Justifiability or warranted assertability is a matter of «solidarity» with an 
epistemic community, If we take the relevant epistemic community to be S's 
culture, then her claim is not warranted. But the relevant epistemic commu- 
nity does not always have to be the actual community S happens to be in. 
However, warranted assertability is not independent of some community o 
rother. And, again, appeal to an «ideal,> community would not make norma- 
tivity l e s ~  contextual, for even then correctness is anchored to an epistemic 
context, namely, the one provided by the «ideal,> community as we conceive 
It. 
Putnam's idealization theory of truth and warranted assertability does not 
succeed in establishing a more substantial notion of correctness than the con- 
textual normativity of a pragmatism i la Rorty. The idealization strategy does 
not seem to work unless backed with an epistemological realism that Putnam 
clearly would not accept. Putnam's claim that there is a fact of the matter about 
justifiability which is independent of community standards seems to have two 
different readings. O n  the one hand, Putnam can be read as claiming simply 
that assertability is not confined ro institutionalized norms, that the accepta- 
bility of one's assertions should not be restricted to the norms of one's cultu- 
re. But this claim does not really entail a context-transcendent notion of 
objective rightness, but only the idea that institutionalized normative contexts 
are not exclusive or privileged (and, as 1 just suggested, this seems to be con- 
genial with RortyS view). O n  a stronger reading, Putnam can be taken to be 
saying that there is an objective notion of justifiability completely indepen- 
dent of the epistemic standards of any community whatsoever, a n objective 
order of reasons to which our ideas of ideal justification and ideal acceptabili- 
tity refer. The weak reading does not seem to take Putnam where he wants to 
go, but the strong reading takes him much further than he seems willing 
to travel. 
Putnam's idealization theory of truth contains two key claims that are at 
odds with each other, namely: 
1. that truth is independent of justification here and now, but not indepen- 
dent of al1 justification; 
11. that truth is expected to be stable or ~ c o n v e r ~ e n t n ~ ~ .  
If the truth of a statement is supposed to be dependent on its justification, 
on its acceptability by certain standards, truth cannot be expected to be sta- 
ble or convergent across relevantly different epistemic contexts (no matter how 
49. «S may be &e unhonored prophet of some social movement or intellecrual revolution whose 
time has not yet comen, ibid., p. 450. 
50. <<Referente and Trurh,,, ibid., p. 85; and RTH,  ibid., p. 56. 
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much we idealize the notions of justification and a~ce~tab i l i ty ) .  No strong 
convergence can obtain once we tie truth to justification. 
The problem comes from running ((warranted)) together with ctrue)). It is 
the identification of truth with ideal rational acceptability which is itself pro- 
blematic. It is not clear how Putnam can combine a non-foundational and 
strongly contextualist view of justification with a realist concept of truth unless 
he keeps them separate. But to keep truth and justification separate is to deny 
that the concept of truth is epistemic. This is what a deflationary view of truth 
enables one to do. Why doesn't Putnam take the deflationary route? Why 
doesn't he limit his minimal realism to a disquotational account of truth? 
IV. Does interna1 realism need a theory of truth? 
Putnam thinks that there is something more to truth than what is captured 
by the disquotational schema «p' is true if and only if p». In a merely disquo- 
tational view such as Quine's, to say that p is true is simply to assent to p. But 
to reduce truth to assent is to abandon the idea that truth is a substantial 
notion, and for Putnam «this is to give up what is right in realism»jl. ((That 
truth is a pro erty», Putnam says, «is the one insight of "realism" that we should 
not jettison))y2. Recently Putnam has become dissatisfied with his idealizarion 
theory of truth and he no longer identifies truth with ideal a ~ c e ~ t a b i l i t y ~ ~ ,  but 
he still maintains that truth is «a substantive property))54 that has an epistemic 
dimension, and that there is more to truth than a disquotational account can 
provide. 
For Putnam truth is a substantive property that statements have, a pro- 
perty whose nature neither the disquotational schema nor remarks on the use 
of the pedicate ((true)) can capture. He thinks rhat the disquotationalist claim 
that the truth of a sentence is fully expressed by the very assertion of the sen- 
tence amounts to an identification of truth conditions with assertibility con- 
ditions5j. So he contends that according to disquotationalism «the only 
substantive kind of rightness our statements (. . .) possess is warranted asserti- 
bility))56. The problem is that ((nobody has ever given a theory of what ((asser- 
tibility conditions)) are»57, and the only candidates available in the literature 
for an account of assertibility conditions commit us, according to Putnam, to 
behaviorism, cultural relativism, or methodological solipsism: what makes my 
51. See aThe Causal Structure of rhe Physical),, in Realism with a Human Face, ibid., p. 93. 
52. ((A Defense of Inrernal Realism,), in Realism with a Human Face, ibid., p. 32. 
53. See Words and Life, ibid., esp. Preface, <<Does the  Disquotational Theory Solve Al1 
Philosophical Problems?)~, and n o n  Truth)). See foornore 3. 
54. <<On Truth)) ,  ibid., p. 326 
55. H e  interprets the diquorational approach ro truth as the claim that arhe description of tlie 
assertibility conditions (in the sense of confirmarion condirions) for senrences containing 
the word rrue tells us al1 rhere is ro know about rrurh)) (aOn Truthn, ibid., p. 326).  
56. <(Does the Disquotational Theory of Truth Solve Al1 Philosophical Problemsn, ibid., p. 264. 
57. <<On Trurhn, ibid., p. 327. 
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statement assertible is either my behavioral dispositions, or the norms of my lin- 
guistic community, or my own sense data. But Putnam misrerpresents dis- 
quotationalism by characterizing it as just another tbeory of truth. 
As Williams remarks, (c[t]o approach truth in a deflationary spirit is emp- 
hatically not to think of 'true' as denoting a theoretically significant property, 
explicating which will illuminate what is involved in any sentence's being 
t r u e ~ ~ ~ .  As 1 emphasized above (see p. 1 l ) ,  what the Tarsluan biconditionals 
show is that al1 that is involved in a sentence's being true is captured by the 
sentence itself. As Quine puts it, ccone who puzzles over the adjective 'true' 
should uzzle rather over the sentences to which he ascribes it. 'True' is trans- 
parenti>P9 According to traditional theories of truth, however itruth)) deno- 
tes a property shared by al1 true sentences, a property which is the rightful 
object of philosophical theory. A deflationary account of truth is not a theory 
of truth in this sense, but rather an analysis of the truthpredicate. A deflatio- 
nary approach to truth seeks no more than a description of the logical behavior 
of (ctrue)) and a pragmatic account of its utility. This is precisely what a dis- 
quotational account of truth offers. O n  this view the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a sentence's being true are expressed by the sentence itself (cc'p' 
is true iff pn). So what is accomplished by appending the truth-predicate to a 
sentence? According to Quine: ((To ascribe truth to the sentence [«Snow is 
white))] is to ascribe whiteness to snow.. . Ascription of truth just cancels the 
quotation marks. Truth is disquotation))GO. 
A deflationist can be content with a disquotational analysis of the truth- 
predicate and a pragmatic elucidation of the contexts of use of that predicate61. 
But for someone who still strives for a theory of truth, for someone who thinks 
that the property that cctruth)) denotes needs theoretical clarification, the dis- 
quotational-cum-pragmatic analysis of «truex is bound to be deeply dissatisf- 
ying, for it says nothing about what makes al1 true sentences true. The contention 
of deflationism is precisely that there is nothing to sayó2, that there is no sin- 
gle thing that al1 true statements share, that truth does not have an essence and 
true statements do not constitute a ccnatural kind)) or a theoretically inceresting 
category. As Williams puts it: «On a deflationary view, then, true sentences 
constitute a merely nominal kind. We could even say that, for a deflationist, 
though there are endlessly many truths, there is no such thing as t ~ u t h ) ' ~ .  
58. Unnatural Doubts, ibid., p. 11 1. 
59. W .  V. Quine, Pursuit of Tvuth (Harvard University Press: 1990), p. 82. 
60. Ibid., p. 80. 
61. As Williams puts it, for a deflarionisr ((remarks on  the behaviour and utiliry of the rrurh-pre- 
dicate say just abour everything there is to sap about rruthn ( Unnatural Doubts, ibid., p. 11 1). 
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Putnam fails to take seriously the main insight of disquotationalism, namely, 
the deflationist claim that truth is not a property at al1 (neither warranted 
assertibility nor ideal justification nor anything else). O n  a disquotational view, 
to say that a sentence is true is not to ascribe a property to the sentence but 
just to reaffirm the sentenceG4. So ((p is true» is expected to be assertible whe- 
never «p» is. However, this does not mean that «p is true)) says that «p is asser- 
tible)), any more than ((p)) itself doesG5. And, a fortiori, it does not mean that c(p 
is truen is equivalent to «p is assertible by the norms of m y linguistic com- 
munityn. Because on a deflationary view there is only (cimmanent truth)), 
Putnam thinks that a disquotational account of truth identifies the meaning of 
«true» with ccassertible according to the norms of a particular community)), 
and he concludes that a deflationary attitude towards truth commits one to 
cultural relativismGG. But, as Williams has argued, adopting a deflationary view 
of truth is not itself sufficient to make one a relativist: «to say that commu- 
nity practice is the basis for assessments of rightness is not to say that the stan- 
dards embodied in such practice constitute a linguistic straight-ja~ket))~'. 
Deflationism is perfectly compatible with a minimal realism that makes truth 
context-transcendent. Since a deflationist does not analyze truth in epistemic 
terms, he does not identi5 truth with the contextual notion of justifiability 
or assertibility. And precisely because on a deflationary view truth is not an 
epistemic property, a deflationist has no difficulty expressing a corrigibilist 
outlook. 
As Williams remarks, it is the threat of relativism that seems to prevent 
Putnam from taking seriously «the deflationist's claim that there is no reason 
to suppose that truth has a n a t ~ r e ) ) ~ * .  But that threat disappears when we rea- 
lize that on a deflationary view truth has no epistemic content whatsoever. 
Being non-epistemic without being metaphysical, a deflationary notion of 
truth can accommodate perfectly well the realist intuitions that Putnam wants 
to preserve. In fact interna1 realism would be better off with a deflationary 
attitude towards truth, for, as we have seen, the identification of truth with 
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due ro the performative force of arrue,>. However, it is an open question what <(pragmaric» 
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justification in Putnam's idealization theory does not succeed in making truth 
context-transcendent. But Putnam stresses that «as thinkers we are commited 
to there being some kind of truth, some kind of correctness which is substan- 
tia1 and not merely "disquotational"»69. However, saying that truth is disquo- 
tational prevents philosophical inflation but it does not weaken our ordinary 
notion of truth. We are indeed ((committed to there being some kind of truth)). 
But there is nothing that commits us to think of true statements as a natural 
kind and to think of truth as havin an essence, as something for which phi- 
7% losophical theories are appropriate . 
Putnam is right in protesting that a disquotational theory does n o t ((solve 
al1 philosophical problems)) concerning the notion of truth71. But the point 
is that disquotationalism does not even address those problems (other than 
indirectly, by showing that there is nothing wrong with our ordinary notion of 
truth, that the ordinary uses of «true» are in fact transparent). So to depict 
deflationary accounts as weak attempts to solve philosophical problems about 
truth is an imporatnt misrepresentation, for these are not genuine problems 
for the deflationist and if he addresses them at al1 it is to disolve them rather than 
to solve them. Putnam's complaint that deflationism ((contains no answer to 
the question What is the nature of the property t r u t h ? ~ ~ ~  shows that he is still 
under the sway of problems inherited from traditional theories of truth. If we 
think of truth as a property then it becomes a question what kind of property 
it is, whether absolute or relative, whether metaphysical or epistemic, whet- 
her indefinable or reducible to something else, etc. Both the correspondence 
theory of truth of realism and the acceptance theory of truth of anti-realism 
are answers to these questions; they both try to give a theoretical elucidation of 
the concept of truth by offering a certain picture of what truth consists in. 
But, as we have seen, both the metaphysical and the epistemic picture of truth 
have their own special dificulties; they both render truth problematic. As Fine 
points out, «the way out [of these problems] is not to "construe" truth at all», 
to adopt «a no-theory attitude toward the concept of t r ~ t h » ~ ~ .  This deflationary 
attitude that Fine rtecommends comes from the recognition that «truth» is «a 
concept already in use» and that we should respect its customary ~ ~ r a m m a r ) ) ~ ~ .  
If the concept of truth is a ((fundamental semantical concept)) (or family of 
concepts), we should not expect it to be amenable to explication and we should 
be ((inclined to reject a 11 interpretations, theories, construals, pictures, etc., of 
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truthn as reductive or c irc~lar '~ .  So, far from being an alternative theory of 
truth, a deflationist view of truth should be taken to be, as Fine puts it, the 
expression of a ano-theory attitude toward truthn. 
If internal realism is not just a conciliatory solution, a middle way betwe- 
en metaphysical realism and relativism, but something more radical, i.e. a way 
of scaping from the dilemma or a way of disolving the dilemma, it must reject 
the premise that makes the dilemma possible: that is, the assumption that 
truth is a property in need of clarification. As long as the internal realist keeps 
this premise and continues to strive for a theory of truth, he cannot stop the 
oscillation between realist and anti-realist pictures of truth; the only success 
he can obtain on this turf is to reduce the oscillation to a minimum, to achie- 
ve some stability in the center; but the tension will still remain. 
75. Ibid., p. 149. 
